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THE IMPERIAL SCHOLAR: REFLECTIONS ON A REVIEW
OF CIVIL RIGHTS LITERATURE
RICHARD DELGADOt
I. CIVIL RIGHTS SCHOLARSHIP-IDENTIFYING A TRADITION
When I began teaching law in the mid-1970's, I was told by a
number of well-meaning senior colleagues to "play things straight" in
my scholarship-to establish a reputation as a scholar in some main-
stream legal area and not get too caught up in civil rights or other
"ethnic" subjects. Being young, impressionable, and anxious to succeed,
I took their advice to heart and, for the first six years of my career,
produced a steady stream of articles, book reviews, and the like, impec-
cably traditional in substance and form. The dangers my friends
warned me about were averted; the benefits accrued. Tenure securely
in hand, I turned my attention to civil rights law and scholarship.
Realizing I had a great deal of catching up to do, I asked my
research assistant to compile a list of the twenty or so leading law re-
view articles on civil rights. I gave him the criteria you would expect:
frequent citation by courts and commentators; publication in a major
law review; theoretical rather than practical focus, and so on. When he
submitted the list, I noticed that each of the authors was white. Each
was also male. I checked his work myself, with the same result. Fur-
ther, a review of the footnotes of these articles disclosed a second re-
markable coincidence-the works cited were also written by authors
who were themselves white and male. I was puzzled. I knew that there
are about one hundred Black, twenty-five Hispanic, and ten Native
American law professors teaching at American law schools.' Many of
t Professor of Law, UCLA. J.D. 1974, University of California, Berkeley.
I acknowledge the careful criticism and constructive comments of Derrick Bell, Michael
Olivas, and Henry McGee, professors of law, in the preparation of this manuscript.
They gave new meaning to the term "colleague." An earlier version of this paper was
delivered at Harvard Law School in April 1983.
1 A directory of minority law professors listed 133 Black law professors, 22 Span-
ish-surnamed professors, and 4 American Indian professors for 1979-80. SECTION ON
MINORITY GROUPS, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1979-80 DIREC-
TORY OF MINORITY LAW FACULTY MEMBERS (D.Bell ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
1979-80 DIRECTORY]. The 1981-82 edition of this directory listed 198 Black law
professors, 20 Chicano and Puerto Rican law professors, and 15 American Indian
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them are writing in areas about which they care deeply: antidiscrimina-
tion law, the equality principle, and affirmative action. Much of that
scholarship, however, seems to have been consigned to oblivion.2 Courts
rarely cite it, and the legal scholars whose work really counts almost
never do. The important work is published in eight or ten law reviews
and is written by a small group of professors, who teach in the major
law schools.8
professors. These figures do not include administrators, librarians, or professors not on
tenure tracks.
' See Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 4 n.2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bell, Price of Racial Remedies]
(listing minority scholarship overlooked by the Supreme Court in Bakke, including arti-
cles by Mildred Ravenell, Ralph Smith, Derrick Bell, Cruz Reynoso, Leo Romero, and
Richard Delgado). See also D. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed.
1980), the footnotes of which contain extensive reference to articles and books by mi-
nority legal scholars.
I The following are frequently cited authors, together with representative articles:
Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy
Controls, 26 STAN. L. REV. 245 (1974); Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961); Bittker, The
Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE
L.J. 1387 (1962); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421 (1960); Blasi, Bakke As Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory? 67
CALIF. L. REV. 21 (1979); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: In
Defense of the Antidiscrinination Principle, 90 H.AV. L. R~v. 1 (1976); Cox, The
Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promo-
tion of Human Rights, 80 HARy. L. REV. 91 (1966); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Im-
pact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36
(1977); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racal Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 723 (1974); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally
Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 351 (1970); Greenawalt, Judicial Scru-
tiny of "Benign" Racial Preferences in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
559 (1975); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and "The
Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 531 (1963); Henkin, Shelley v. Krae-
mer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Horowitz, Un-
separate but Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School
Education, 13 UCLA L. REv. 1147 (1966); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal
World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L.
REV. 363 (1966); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizen-
ship under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Karst &
Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 955 (1974);
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); O'Neil, Racial
Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV. 925 (1974);
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959); Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education:
Political Responsibilities and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975); St.
Antoine, Color Blindness but not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protec-
tion, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REv. 993 (1961); Tribe,
Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?,
[Vol. 132:561
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Most of this latter work, to be sure, seems strongly supportive of
minority rights. It is all the more curious that these authors, the giants
in the field, only infrequently cite a minority scholar. My assistant and
I prepared an informal sociogram, a pictorial representation of who-
cites-whom in the civil rights literature. It is fascinating. Paul Brest
cites Laurence Tribe. Laurence Tribe cites Paul Brest and Owen Fiss.
Owen Fiss cites Bruce Ackerman, who cites Paul Brest and Frank
Michelman, who cites Owen Fiss and Laurence Tribe and Kenneth
Karst ....
It does not matter where one enters this universe; one comes to the
same result: an inner circle of about a dozen white, male writers who
comment on, take polite issue with, extol, criticize, and expand on each
other's ideas." It is something like an elaborate minuet.
The failure to acknowledge minority scholarship extends even to
nonlegal propositions and assertions of fact. W.E. DuBois, deceased
Black historian, receives an occasional citation.5 Aside from him, little
else rates a mention. Higginbotham's monumental In the Matter of
Color' might as well not exist. The same is true of the work of Ken-
neth Clark,1 Black psychologist and past president of the American
Psychological Association, and Alvin Poussaint,8 Harvard Medical
School professor and authority on the psychological impact of race. One
searches in vain for references to the powerful book by physicians Grier
and Cobbs, Black Rage,' or to Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the
Earth,10 or even to writings of or about Martin Luther King, Jr.,1"
Cesar Chavez, 2 and Malcolm X."3 When the inner circle writers need
92 HARv. L. REV. 864 (1979); Van AIstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme
Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1979); Van Alstyne & Karst,
State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). The list contains articles published
during the last 24 years; an adjustment has been made for recency of publication; rela-
tively recent articles were included in the list even though they had received fewer
citations than older articles. Not all authors have been active at a given time.
4 Cf Bell, Price of Racial Remedies, supra note 2, at 3-4, 6 (discussion of domi-
nant role of white professors in the minority admissions debate).
' See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 3, at 1416 n.15 (citing DuBois, Does the Negro
Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUc. 328, 331 (1935)).
6 L. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978).
7 K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO (1965); K. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD
(1955).
8 J. COMER & A. POUSSAINT, BLACK CHILD CARE (1975).
9 W. GRIER & P. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968).
10 F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (C. Farrington trans. 1966).
11 E.g., M.L. KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1964); M.L. KING, JR.,
STRENGTH TO LOVE (1963); M.L. KING, JR., WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE:
CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? (1968).
12 E.g., J. LEVY, CESAR CHAVEZ: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LA CAUSA (1975); P.
MATHIESSEN, SAL SI PUEDES: CESAR CHAVEZ AND THE NEW AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION (1969).
13 A. HALEY & MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1964).
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authority for a factual or social scientific proposition about race they
generally cite reports of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights1 4 or else each other.
1 5
A single anecdote may help to illustrate what I mean. Recently a
law professor who writes about civil rights showed me, for my edifica-
tion, a draft of an article of his. It is, on the whole, an excellent article.
It extols the value of a principle I will call "equal personhood." Equal
personhood is the notion, implicit in several constitutional provisions
and much case law, that each human being, regardless of race, creed, or
color, is entitled to be treated with equal respect. To treat someone as
an outsider, a nonmember of human society, violates this principle and
devalues the self-worth of the person so excluded.
I have no quarrel with this premise, but, on reading the one hun-
dred-plus footnotes of the article, I noticed that its author failed to cite
Black or minority scholars, an exclusion from the community of kin-
dred souls as glaring as any condemned in the paper. I pointed this out
to the author, citing as illustration a passage in which he asserted that
unequal treatment can cause a person to suffer a withered self-concept.
Having just written an article on a related subject, 8 I was more or less
steeped in withered self-concepts. I knew who the major authorities
were in that area.
The professor's authority for the proposition about withered self-
concepts was Frank Michelman, writing in the Harvard Law Review.
14 See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON HousING (1961), cited
in Kaplan, supra note 3, at 397 n.67; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON
EDUCATION (1961), cited in Kaplan, supra note 3, at 399 n.75.
15 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. This phenomenon may be con-
trasted with that which prevails in social science research. It is my own experience that
in this other body of scholarly writing, minority status constitutes virtually a presump-
tion of expertise; Blacks writing about the Black community and Chicanos about the
Chicano community are accepted as equal (perhaps more-than-equal) partners. Indeed,
ethnic studies departments sometimes resist hiring Caucasian faculty members out of
the belief that they are generally less qualified for the position than candidates who are
members of the minority group in question. Telephone interview with Michael Olivas,
Director, Institute on Law & Higher Education, University of Houston (September 14,
1983).
Why the ready acceptance of minority scholars in social science research dealing
with minority issues when minority legal scholars receive quite different treatment?
Social science research may be less threatening to the status quo than legal research;
much social science research is descriptive rather than change-oriented. Also, social sci-
ence research may be peripheral to fundamental reallocations of power and decision-
making authority; in contrast, legal scholarship may portend drastic changes in the
status quo. See infra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
" Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
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I pointed out that although Frank Michelman may be a superb scholar
and teacher, he probably has relatively little first-hand knowledge
about withered self-concepts. I suggested that the professor add refer-
ences to such works as Kenneth Clark's Dark Ghetto1" and Grier and
Cobbs's Black Rage,"' and he agreed to do so. To justify his selection of
Frank Michelman for the proposition about withered self-concept, the
author explained that Michelman's statement was "so elegant."
Could inelegance of expression explain the absence of minority
scholarship from the text and footnotes of leading law review articles
about civil rights? Elegance is, without question, a virtue in writing, in
conversation, or in. anything else in life. If minority scholars write inel-
egantly and Frank Michelman writes elegantly, then it would not be
surprising if the latter were read and cited more frequently, and the
former less so. But minority legal scholars seem to have less trouble
being recognized and taken seriously in areas of scholarship other than
civil rights theory.19 If elegance is a problem for minority scholars, it
seems mainly to be so in the core areas of civil rights: affirmative ac-
tion, the equality principle, and the theoretical foundations of race rela-
tions law.
In 1971, Judge Skelly Wright wrote an article entitled, Professor
Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court.20 In the arti-
cle, Judge Wright took a group of scholars to task for their bloodless
carping at the Warren Court's decisions in the areas of racial justice
and human rights. He accused the group of missing the central point in
these decisions-their moral clarity and passion for justice-and la-
belled the group's excessive preoccupation with procedure and institu-
tional role and its insistence that the Court justify every element of a
decision under general principles of universal application, a "scholarly
17 K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO (1965).
11 W. GRIER & P. COBBS, supra note 9.
19 Articles and books by Harry Edwards and William Gould on labor law are
widely cited in that field. For example, Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involv-
ing Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969), has been cited in 7 cases
and 34 law review articles. See SHEPARD'S LAW REVIEW CITATIONS (1979 & Sept.
1983). Similarly, Edwards, Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH.
L.REv. 885 (1973), has been cited in 41 cases and 30 law review articles. See SHEP-
ARD'S LAW REVIEW CITATIONS (1979 & Sept. 1983). Henry McGee's articles and
casebook on housing law are considered major works in the field. My own work is cited
in such sundry places as M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 300 (3d ed. 1983); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944 (2d ed. 1983); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 1074
(1982); M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, JR., CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON
BIOETHICS AND LAW 18, 55, 100, 174, 278, 308, 451; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 15-8, at 912 n.12 (1978).
10 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
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tradition."'2 1
I think I have discovered a second scholarly tradition. It consists of
white scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority
scholars from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship. The main-
stream writers tend to acknowledge only each other's work. It is even
possible that, consciously or not, they resist entry by minority scholars
into the field,2 2 perhaps counseling them, as I was counseled, to estab-
lish their reputations in other areas of law. I believe that this "scholarly
tradition" exists mainly in civil rights; nonwhite scholars in other fields
of law seem to confront no such tradition.23
II. DEFECTS IN IMPERIAL SCHOLARSHIP
To this point, I have been making an empirical claim. A person
who disagreed with my thesis could attempt to show that some white
inner-circle authors do cite nonwhite scholars appropriately, perhaps
by introducing a sociogram of his or her own. My examination of the
literature in the field, while admittedly not a scientific study, leads me
to believe this is a vain task. A second response would assert that the
exclusion of minority viewpoints from white scholarship about civil
rights is, as they say, harmless error; it doesn't matter who advocates
freedom and equality, as long as they are advocated by someone.
In one sense, this assertion echoes the holding of Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,-' which gave white tenants standing
to challenge a building owner's racially discriminatory renting practices
on the ground that these rendered the building a white ghetto and de-
prived the tenants of interracial contacts. Everyone, not just minorities,
has an interest in achieving a racially just society, so why should not
anyone be free to advocate it in print? Does a contrary policy not deny
free speech and constitute a gratuitous rejection of a helping hand?
Put in simple terms, what difference does it make if the scholar-
ship about the rights of group A is written by members of group B?
Although Derrick Bell raised this question in a footnote,25 no one
seems to have addressed it directly. There are, however, legal doctrines
and case law that may suggest answers by way of analogy. Relevant
21 Id. at 776-77 (tradition pursued by "self-appointed scholastic mandarins"); id.
at 784, 789-92, 803 (further criticism of "scholarly tradition").
22 See infra notes 64-70, 77 and accompanying text.
23 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
24 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
2'5 Bell, Price of Racial Remedies, supra note 2, at 4 n.2.
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doctrines include standing,2" real party in interest,27 and jus tertii,2"
doctrines which in general insist that B does not belong in court if he or
she is attempting, without good reason, to assert the rights of, or redress
the injuries to A. We also have rules pertaining to joinder of parties,29
intervention,"0 and representation in class suits,3 all of which serve to
assure that the appropriate parties are before the court. On a more
general level, our political and legal values contain an antipaternalistic
principle that forbids B from asserting A's interest if A is a competent
human being of adult years, capable of independently deciding upon
and asserting that interest.
Abstracting from these principles, it is possible to compile an a
priori list of reasons why we might look with concern on a situation in
which the scholarship about group A is written by members of group
B. First, members of group B may be ineffective advocates of the rights
and interests of persons in group A. They may lack information; more
important, perhaps, they may lack passion, or that passion may be mis-
directed. B's scholarship may tend to be sentimental, diffusing passion
in useless directions, or wasting time on unproductive breast-beating.
Second, while the B's might advocate effectively, they might advocate
the wrong things. Their agenda may differ from that of the A's;" they
may pull their punches with respect to remedies, especially where rem-
edying A's situation entails uncomfortable consequences for B. Despite
the best of intentions, B's may have stereotypes embedded deep in their
psyches that distort their thinking, causing them to balance interests in
ways inimical to A's. Finally, domination by members of group B may
paralyze members of group A, causing the A's to forget how to flex
their legal muscles for themselves.
A careful reading of the inner circle articles suggests that many of
the above mentioned problems and pitfalls are not simply hypothetical,
but do in fact occur. A number of the authors were unaware of basic
facts about the situation in which minority persons live or ways in
26 See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES
AND MATERIALS 523 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as COUND]. See generally Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CH. L. REV. 601 (1968) (discussing relation-
ship between standing and plaintiff interests in constitutional challenges to government
expenditures by taxpayers).
217 See COUND, supra note 26, at 522-26; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
28 See 11 AM. JUR. 2D Bills and Notes § 655 (1963).
29 See COUND, supra note 26, at 522-53; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 18, 19.
SO See COUND, supra note 26, at 625-42; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
2 See COUND, supra note 26, at 561-601; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
32 For a discussion of the conflict between the traditional civil rights lawyer, the
black litigants, and the white liberal financial supporters, see Clark, The Lawyer in the
Civil Rights Movement-Catalytic Agent or Counter-revolutionary?, 19 U. KANS. L.
REV. 459, 469 (1971).
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which they see the world. From the viewpoint of a minority member,
the assertions and arguments made by nonminority authors were some-
times so naive as to seem incomprehensible and hardly merit serious
consideration. For example, some writers took seriously the reductio ad
absurdum argument about an infinitude of minorities (if Blacks and
Hispanics, why not Belgians, Swedes, and Italians; what about an indi-
vidual who is one-half Black, or three-quarters Hispanic?),"3 or wor-
ried about whether a white citizen forced to associate with Blacks has
his or her freedom of association violated as much as a Black compelled
to attend segregated schools." One author reasoned that Carolene
Products "footnote four" analysis is no longer fully applicable to Amer-
ican Blacks, because they have ceased to be an insular minority in need
of heightened judicial protection.35 Another placed the burden on pro-
ponents of preferential admissions to show that no nonracial alternative
exists, because today's minority may become tomorrow's majority and
vice versa.36
In addition to factual ignorance or naivet6, some of the writing
suffered from a failure of empathy, an inability to share the values,
desires, and perspectives of the population whose rights are under con-
sideration. In his article, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,3 7 Derrick Bell
pointed out that litigators in school desegregation cases have often
seemed unaware of what their clients really wanted, or have pursued
one remedy (e.g., integration) out of ideological commitment, even
though the client wanted something different (e.g., better schools). 8 A
similar distancing of the scholar from the community he writes about
was visible in the civil rights commentaries. The authors in the core
group tended to be very concerned about procedure. Many of the arti-
cles were devoted, in various measures, to scholarly discussions of the
standard of judicial review that should be applied in different types of
civil rights suits.39 Others were concerned with the relationship be-
tween federal and state authority in antidiscrimination law, or with the
respective competence of a particular decisionmaker to recognize and
redress racial discrimination.4 ° One could easily conclude that the ques-
33 Graglia, supra note 3, at 352; Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 804-07.
3 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 34.
35 Fiss, supra note 3, at 7.
36 O'Neil, supra note 3, at 933-34; cf. supra note 33 and accompanying text.
37 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
3 See id. at 471-72, 482-87.
39 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 727; Fiss, supra note 3, at 7; Greenawalt, supra
note 3, at 559; O'Neil, supra note 3, at 927; Tribe, supra note 3, at 865-67.
40 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 3, at 43-46; Tribe, supra note 3, at 876-77;
[Vol. 132:561
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tion of who goes to court, what court they go to, and with what stan-
dard of review, are the burning issues of American race-relations law.
Perhaps the emphasis on procedure and judicial role is harmless, just a
peculiar kink lawyers get in law school; but, as I will argue later in
this essay, there is more to it than that.41
Other peculiarities of perspective surfaced in connection with
choosing a principle on which to base (or oppose) affirmative action.
Measures to increase minority representation in education and the
work force have been justified in three broad ways: reparations (or ret-
ribution);42 social utility,43 or distributive justice."" The reparations ar-
gument emphasizes that white society has mistreated Blacks, Native
Americans, and Hispanics and now must make amends for that mis-
treatment. Utility-based arguments justify affirmative action on the
ground that increased representation of minorities will be useful to soci-
ety. The distributive justice rationale says that there is a certain
amount of wealth available and argues that everyone is entitled to a
minimum share of it. Many of the minority scholars emphasize the
reparations argument and stress the inherent cost to Whites; the au-
thors of the inner circle articles generally make the case on the grounds
of utility or distributive justice.45
Wechsler, supra note 3.
41 See infra text accompanying note 72.
42 See, e.g., D. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 44-47 (2d ed.
1980).
43 See, e.g., Karst & Horowitz, supra note 3, at 964-66.
44 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 3, at 13.
41 Compare, e.g., D. BELL, JR., supra note 42, at 44-47 ("Reparations for Ra-
cism"); Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (It follows that the "availability of fourteenth amend-
ment protection in racial cases may not actually be determined by the character of harm
suffered by blacks or the quantum of liability proved against whites." Instead racial
remedies may be the "outward manifestations of unspoken . . . judicial conclusions
that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal interests
deemed important by middle and upper class whites.") and Burns, Law and Race in
America, in THE POLrrICs OF LAW 82 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (historical examples of
racially disparate treatment) with Brest, supra note 3, at 49-51 (rejecting group-based
reparations and distributive justice); Ely, supra note 3, at 723 (concern with utility,
curing society of the sickness of racism); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 3, at 964-66
(utility); Michelman, supra note 3, at 13 (distributive justice); Sandalow, supra note 3,
at 673-74 (utility) and Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 803-10 (social disutility: affirma-
tive action will lead to competition and resentment among racial minorities). But see
Black, Civil Rights in Times of Economic Stress-Jurisprudential and Philosophic As-
pects, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 566 (1981); Black, supra note 3 (Black, a nonminority
author derives duty to redress racial discrimination from society's past misconduct to-
ward Blacks); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Ap-
proach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 615-22 (1977) (nonminority author ar-
gues for affirmative action to correct injustices grounded in history and contemporary
reality).
19841
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Emphasizing utility or distributive justice as the justification for
affirmative action has a number of significant consequences. It enables
the writer to concentrate on the present and the future and overlook the
past. There is no need to dwell on unpleasant matters like lynch mobs,
segregated bathrooms, Bracero programs, migrant farm labor camps,
race-based immigration laws, or professional schools that, until re-
cently, were lily white. The past becomes irrelevant; one just asks
where things are now and where we ought to go from here, a straight-
forward social-engineering inquiry of the sort that law professors are
familiar with and good at. But just as the adoption of either of the two
present-oriented perspectives renders the investigation comfortably safe,
it robs affirmative action programs of their moral force in favor of a
sterile theory of fairness or utility.46 No doubt there is a great social
utility to affirmative action, but to base it solely on that ground ignores
the right of minority communities to be made whole, and the obligation
of the majority to render them whole. Moreover, what if the utility
calculus changes in the future, so that the programs no longer appear
"useful" to the majority ? 7 Can society then ignore those who still suf-
fer the effects of past discrimination?
Distributive justice is a somewhat less objectionable ground for
justifying affirmative action, but it too ignores history and makes for a
rather weak, -pallid case. It also invites the neutral-principles re-
sponse:48 if the idea is to start playing fair now, how can we achieve
fairness by discriminating against whites? Moreover, the remedies es-
poused under both the social utility and distributive justice rationales
are often justified because they have been voluntarily created by legisla-
tures, employers, or schools. 49 A "we-they" analysis, espoused by sev-
eral of the commentators,5" justifies a disadvantage that we (the major-
46 In some guises, utility-based justifications are also demeaning. In law school
admissions, for example, majority persons may be admitted as a matter of right, while
minorities are admitted because their presence will contribute to "diversity." Diversity
means that the minority admittees have different skin color, different life experiences,
and bring different perspectives, for example perspectives on police conduct, to the
classroom. The assumption is that such diversity is educationally valuable to the major-
ity. But such an admissions program may well be perceived as treating the minority
admittee as an ornament, a curiosity, one who brings an element of the piquant to the
lives of white professors and students. Do not women treated in this manner complain,
rightly, for the same reasons?
11 Cf. Graglia, supra note 3, at 361 (affirmative admission of minorities doomed
to fail; programs will only lead to frustration and failure and so are not socially useful).
4 See Graglia, supra note 3, at 352; Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 809-10. For a
discussion of the neutral-principles theory, see generally Wechsler, supra note 3.
9 E.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 732-40 ("we-they" analysis shows that discrimina-
tion of majority against itself is benign, thus permissible).
50 Id. at 732-38; Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 569-76; see also Brest, supra note
3, at 16-17 ("benign" racial discrimination benefitting minority at expense of society at
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ity) want to impose on ourselves to favor them (the minority). This type
of thinking, however, leaves the choice of remedy and the time frame
for that remedy in the hands of the majority; it converts affirmative
action into a benefit, not a right. It neglects the possibility that a disad-
vantaged minority may have a moral claim to a particular remedy.
The inner-circle commentators rarely deal with issues of guilt and
reparation. When they do, it is often to attach responsibility to a scape-
goat, someone of another time or place, and almost certainly of another
social class than that of the writer. These writers tend to focus on in-
tentional and determinable acts of discrimination inflicted on the victim
by some perpetrator and ignore the more pervasive and invidious forms
of discriminatory conditions inherent in our society. This "perpetrator"
perspective51 deflects attention from the victim-class, the Blacks, Native
Americans, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans who lead blighted lives for
reasons directly traceable to social and institutional injustice.
A corollary of this perspective is that racism need not be remedied
by means that encroach too much on middle or upper-class preroga-
tives. 2 If racial inequality is mainly the fault of the isolated redneck,
outmoded ritual violence, or even long abrogated governmental actions,
then remedies that would encroach on simple "conditions" of
life-middle-class housing patterns, for example, or the autonomy of
local school boards-are unnecessary. 3 Many persons of minority race
see racism as including institutional components that extend far beyond
lynch mobs, segregated schools, or epithets like "nigger" or "spick. ' ' r
Self-interest, mixed with inexperience, may make it difficult for the




"1 The term "perpetrator" perspective is used in Freeman, Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review, in THE PoLrrIcs OF LAW 96, 98-99 (D. Kairys ed. 1982);
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Crit-
ical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-54 (1978). The
perpetrator perspective has been embraced by authors in varying forms and to varying
degrees. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the antidiscrimination principle
which lies at the core of most state and federal civil rights legislation: "By definition the
antidiscrimination principle applies only to race-dependent decisions and their effects."
Id. at 5); Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 132-55 (motive analysis: to offer protection, the
Court must be convinced that the decisionmaker's motives are illicit).
52 See supra sources cited in note 51; Bell, Price of Racial Remedies, supra note
2, at 7-12, 19.
" For a discussion of the resistance of whites to any policy requiring them to pay
for racial wrongs they did not themselves commit, see Bell, Price of Racial Remedies,
supra note 2, at 3-4, 12, 16.
5 On institutional racism, see Wasserstrom, supra note 45, at 596-603.
5 Such persons rarely, if ever, experience group-based harm or confront social
institutions that are systematically biased against them; all injurious treatment that
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The uniformity of life experience of the inner circle of writers may
color not only the way they conceptualize and frame problems of race,
but also the solutions or remedies they devise. Remedies pursued at "all
deliberate speed""6 or couched in terms of vague targets and goals en-
tered the law when the legal system turned in earnest to problems of
race. Their appearance is probably related to a utility-based perspective
which ignores past injustices and simply seeks to engineer a solution
with the most utility to society as a whole and the minimal amount of
disruption. If the issue is not one of simple injustice requiring immedi-
ate correction, but merely an unfortunate and abstractly created prob-
lem requiring remedy, that leisurely treatment is not surprising.
Moreover, regardless of the scope and time frame of racial reme-
dies, their costs are generally imposed disproportionately on minorities
and lower-class whites. 57 Most university affirmative action programs,
for example, pit minorities against each other and against low-income
whites. The programs generate hostility among these groups,58 while
exempting from such unpleasantness the high-achieving white product
of a private prep school and Ivy League college,59 who can remain
aloof from these battles. There is an alternative-an overhaul of the
admissions process and a rethinking of the criteria that make a person a
deserving law student and future lawyer. It would be possible to devise
admission standards that would result in a proportionate number of
minorities, whites, and women gaining admission. Minority commenta-
tors have suggested such an approach, 60 but it has been often ignored
and never instituted.
Despite the potential bias of mainstream scholarship, it might be
argued that law review writing is basically harmless. The reviews are
almost never read by anyone outside a narrow readership and rarely
have any impact on the real world. Since the genre is essentially innoc-
comes their way is individually based, and comparatively infrequent. Why should not
this same picture apply to minorities, who are simply subject to a somewhat more
incessant version of it?
" Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955). For a critique of the
Brown remedy, see Wasserstrom, supra note 45, at 599-600; see also Bell, Price of
Racial Remedies, supra note 2, at 11-12 (discussing that mainstream whites may sup-
port nondiscrimination in theory, but avoid or even oppose its remediation).
See Bell, Price of Racial Remedies, supra note 2.
8 Id. at 14-16, 19 (resistance of working class whites to affirmative action pro-
grams); Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 803-10 (affirmative action leads to competition
and resentment among racial minorities).
See Bell, Price of Racial Remedies, supra note 2, at 14.
E.g., Romero, Delgado & Reynoso, The Legal Education of Chicano Students:
A Study in Mutual Accommodation and Cultural Conflict, 5 N.M.L. REv. 177, 188-
90 (1975). For a discussion of the need for more broad-based admission criteria, see
Bell, Price of Racial Remedies, supra note 2, at 17.
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uous, why get excited if the authors of certain articles play by odd
rules?
The game is not harmless. Courts do cite law review articles;61
judges, even. when they do not rely on an article expressly, may still
read and be informed by it. What courts do clearly matters in our soci-
ety. Moreover, what law professors say in their elegant articles contrib-
utes to a legal climate, a culture. Their ideas are read and discussed by
legislators, political scientists, and their own students. They affect what
goes on in courts, law classrooms, and legislative chambers. Ideolo-
gies-perspectives, ways of looking at the world-are powerful. They
limit discourse. They also enable the dominant class to maintain and
justify its own ascendancy. Law professors at the top universities are
part of this dominant class, and their writings contribute to the ideolo-
gies that class creates and subscribes to. These writings are not harm-
less; they have clout.
My conclusion to this point is that there is a second scholarly tra-
dition, that it consists of the exclusion of minority writing about key
issues of race law, and that this exclusion does matter; the tradition
causes bluntings, skewings, and omissions in the literature dealing with
race, racism, and American law. What accounts for, what sustains this
tradition? And, can it be defended or justified?
III. IMPERIAL SCHOLARSHIP-EXPLAINING THE TRADITION
Studied indifference to minority writing on issues of race would be
justified if the writing were second-rate, inelegant, unscholarly, or
unimaginative. But, as was mentioned earlier, minority writers have
had little trouble gaining recognition outside the core areas of civil
rights.62 Poor quality of the writing therefore- seems an unlikely expla-
nation. It could also be argued that minority authors who write about
racial issues are not objective, that passion and anger render them unfit
to reason rigorously or express themselves dearly, while white authors
are above self-interest and thus capable of thinking and writing objec-
tively. But this too seems implausible, for it presupposes that white
writers have no vested interest in the status quo. Moreover, common
experience suggests that most persons, including minorities, perform
better, not worse, at tasks they care deeply about. And, even if minority
authors were offering one-sided views, their suggestions are at least
data, material that deserves mention for what it discloses; one would
"1 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288 n.25 (1978)
(citing 10 law review articles by white male authors).
62 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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not expect such telling data to be completely ignored. When discussing
women's issues, white male elite writers more often seem to cite at least
some white female writers (such as Kay, Weitzman, and Ginsberg)."3
These women write with passion and commitment, qualities that evi-
dently do not render them unfit to be taken seriously. Lack of objectiv-
ity on the part of minority authors, then, seems an inadequate explana-
tion for their treatment at the hands of leading white scholars.
In explaining the strange absence of minority scholarship from the
text and footnotes of the central arenas of legal scholarship dealing with
civil rights, I reject conscious malevolence or crass indifference. I think
the explanation lies at the level of unconscious action and choice.6 4 It
may be that the explanation lies in a need to remain in control, to make
sure that legal change occurs, but not too fast. The desire to shape
events is a powerful human motive and could easily account for much
of the exclusionary scholarship I have noted. The moment one makes
such a statement, however, one is reminded that it is these same liberal
authors who often have been the strongest supporters of affirmative ac-
tion in their own university communities, and who have often been pre-
pared to take chances (as they see it) to advance the goal of an inte-
grated society. Perhaps the two behaviors can be reconciled by
observing that the liberal professor may be pleased to have minority
students and colleagues serve as figureheads, ambassadors of good will,
and future community leaders, but not necessarily happy with the
thought of a minority colleague who might go galloping off in a new
direction.
Once, early in my career, I co-authored a law review article about
Mexican-Americans (as they were called then) as a legally cognizable
class, one that can sue in its own name for injuries to its members.6 5
This was in the mid-1970's when the results of Chicano activism were
just reaching the courts. At that time, a few decisions, notably Lopez
Tijerina v. Henry,6 had held that Chicanos could not sue collectively
63 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 16-27, at 1072 n.16, § 16-28, at 1075
nn.4-5; Karst, supra note 3, at 11 n.56, 55 n.306, 56 n.310, 57 n.320.
" See Blumer, Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position, 1 PAC. L.J. 3,4
(1958) (racial prejudice inhering in a collective sense of group position); Brest, supra
note 3, at 14-15 (discussing "unconscious racially selective indifference"); Lawrence,
Book Review, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831, 841-43 (1983) ("Ideology as an Unconscious
Defense Mechanism").
15 Delgado & Palacios, Mexican-Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class under
Rule 23 and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 393 (1975).
66 48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 916 (1970), dis-
cussed in Delgado & Palacios, supra note 65, at 398-404; see also id. at 398 n.43
(examples of cases in which it was held that Mexican-Americans are not considered a
race for equal protection purposes.)
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because of problems with class definition.67 Some Chicanos speak Span-
ish, some do not; some have Spanish surnames, some do not; some trace
their ancestors to Mexico, some do not. Chicanos were thus held too
amorphous a group to be permitted to sue for class-based relief.6 8 My
article explained several valid ways of getting around the class-defini-
tion problem and gave several reasons why this should happen. Shortly
after the article appeared, I received a long letter from a white litigator
at a public interest law firm that concerns itself with the legal problems
of Mexican-Americans. The letter told me, in clear, terse language, of
the disservice I had done to the cause of Chicano legal rights. Its es-
sence was that the writer's organization had been successfully finessing
the class-definition problem, and my article had instead focused atten-
tion on it, making matters worse. I suffered terrible remorse until the
Supreme Court decided in the following term that Mexican-Americans
are a legally cognizable class for the purpose of civil rights suits.69
Had the litigator, a former professor at a major law school, simply
made a mistake in judgment? Or was there more behind the letter and
its insistence that I stay out of the picture and leave things to persons
who know better? I think many civil-rights activists and scholars derive
a sense of personal satisfaction from being at the forefront of a power-
ful social movement. 0 Command and influence are heady things; it
takes an alert person to realize when to step back, to know when his or
her efforts have begun to interfere with the intended beneficiaries' ef-
fective engagement in their own affairs. The inner-circle authors'
strong identification with their own role may prevent them from under-
standing when it is time for them to begin to leave it behind.
Another closely related motive is fear. Most of the white scholars
who make up the inner circle spent some of their formative years of
teaching during the late 1960's and early 1970's when a number of
extraordinary things were happening in our society. Lawyers, and es-
pecially law professors, are deeply committed to the rule of law; but
during those years the rule of law seemed to mean relatively little.
67 All suits must be brought in the name of an individual or a well-defined group.
See, e.g., Tijerina, 48 F.R.D. at 276-78, discussed in Delgado & Palacios, supra note
65, at 399-401.
68 Tijerina, 48 F.R.D. at 276-77.
9 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-96 (1977); see also Keyes v. School
Dist. No. One, 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973), discussed in Delgado & Palacios, supra note
65, at 396.
70 Cf V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY
577-84 (1966) (In the early 1960's, lawyers for southern Black clients were difficult to
find.); id. at 584-87 (Fear of verbal disapproval, adverse publicity, loss of prestige, and
loss of clients may deter lawyers from accepting unpopular clients.); Lawrence, supra
note 64, at 842-43 (psychology of white leader confronted with fact of racism).
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Events were out of control. Law seemed powerless to stop the popular
tides that surged-the civil rights movement, inner city riots, draft re-
sistance. The professors who now dominate legal scholarship and dic-
tate legal styles saw what the excesses of passion can do. Perhaps,
scarcely knowing it, they came to emphasize scholarship that is con-
trolled, incremental, and seemingly nonideological, and to resist that of
a more tempestuous, change-oriented nature.71 The fear of losing con-
trol would explain a number of things-the emphasis on procedure and
role, the downplaying of substance. 2 It would explain inattention to
the reparations argument 3 and avoidance of issues of guilt and com-
plicity.74 It would explain the treatment of racism and discrimination
as vestigial aberrant behavior not connected by any common thread,
much less illustrating an implied social compact. 5 It would explain the
lack of citation to minority writers, who have drawn attention to some
of the thornier problems and conflicts in the area of race relations.
7
1
71 See sources cited supra note 3; cf. supra text accompanying note 63, where it
was observed that some inner-circle writers do cite feminist writers, even though the
work of many feminist writers shows passion and commitment. Any apparent differ-
ences in these observations are reconcilable. On a general level, feminist literature may
be less threatening to establishment male writers than militant minority literature be-
cause the latter, unlike the former, is identified with a movement that at times in its
history has embraced violence or civil disobedience. Upon close examination, the differ-
ence in treatment of feminist and minority literature may be illusory. The more radical
feminist writers, such as Katherine MacKinnon or Susan Brownmiller, seem to be cited
less often than the more mainstream feminist authors, such as those mentioned in the
text accompanying note 63. Like much minority literature, the generation of more radi-
cal feminists propose far-reaching changes in the ways in which society is constituted.
The more mainstream feminists tend to be more assimilationist in their proposals. In
contrast to the more radical, they are primarily concerned with expanding women's role
within the existing societal framework. The writing of this latter group may thus strike
a sympathetic chord with inner-circle writers, while the work of the more radical group
may be ignored for reasons similar to those that explain the treatment of minority
writers discussed in this Article.
72 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
7 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 45-48 & 51-71 and accompanying text.
7 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
78 Minority writers who have focused on difficult problems overlooked by main-
stream writers include Bell, Price of Racial Remedies, supra note 2, at 12 (discussion
of mainstream opposition to any means to achieve racial equality that burdens the
White majority); Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (conflicts between the goals
of minority clients and their lawyers); Bell, In Defense of Minority Admissions Pro-
grams: A Reply to Professor Graglia, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 364 (1970) (criticism of the
abandonment of efforts undertaken to remedy past racial injustices); Ravenell, DeFunis
and Bakke. . . The Voice Not Heard, 21 How. L.J. 128 (1978) (proposal for achiev-
ing racial diversity in professional schools); Romero, Delgado & Reynoso, supra note
60 (attention to the shortage of minority professionals and the need to alleviate that
shortage); Smith, Reflections on a Landmark. Small Preliminary Observations on the
Development and Significance of the University of California v. Allan Bakke, 21 How.
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Whatever the explanation of the phenomenon, it has not gone un-
noticed. Derrick Bell once observed that the exclusion of minority par-
ticipants from litigation and scholarship about Black issues reminds
him of traditional families of former years in which parents would tell
their children, "Keep quiet. We are talking about you, not to you.""
7
What should be done? As a beginning, minority students and
teachers should raise insistently and often the unsatisfactory quality of
the scholarship being produced by the inner circle-its biases, omis-
sions, and errors. Its presuppositions and world-views should be made
explicit and challenged. That feedback will increase the likelihood that
when a well-wishing white scholar writes about minority problems, he
or she will give minority viewpoints and literature the full considera-
tion due. That consideration may help the author avoid the types of
substantive error catalogued earlier.7
But while no one could object if sensitive white scholars contribute
occasional articles and useful proposals (after all, there are many more
of the mainstream scholars), must these scholars make a career of it?
The time has come for white liberal authors who write in the field of
civil rights to redirect their efforts and to encourage their colleagues to
do so as well. There are many other important subjects that could, and
should, engage their formidable talents. As these scholars stand aside,
nature will take its course; I am reasonably certain that the gap will
quickly be filled by talented and innovative minority writers and com-
mentators. The dominant scholars should affirmatively encourage their
minority colleagues to move in this direction, as well as simply make
the change possible.
Only such a transformation will end the incongruity of one
group's maintenance of a failed ideology for another, an irony that
Judge Wyzanski saw as clearly as anyone:
To leave non-whites at the mercy of whites in the presenta-
tion of non-white claims which are admittedly adverse to the
whites would be a mockery of democracy. Suppression, in-
L.J. 72 (1978) (proposal to revamp current professional school admissions procedures
to compensate for minority deprivation). See generally Symposium, A Step Toward
Equality: Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity, 4 BLACK L.J. 211 (1974).
77 Bell, Price of Racial Remedies, supra note 2, at 4; see also R. WILKINS, A
MAN'S LIFE 216-17 (1982) (author, a Black, attended a high level political strategy
session of "White Brahmins" engaged in planning country's civil rights policy; ex-
pressed anger that minority representatives, except himself, were not present); Law-
rence, supra note 64, at 846 ("Because virtually an entire community of thinkers share
the privileged positions, the need for justifications, and the resulting distorted percep-
tions, those perceptions are mutually confirming and appear undistorted.").
78 See supra text accompanying notes 33-60.
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tentional or otherwise, of the presentation of non-white
claims cannot be tolerated in our society . . . . In presenting
non-white issues non-whites cannot, against their will, be
relegated to white spokesmen, mimicking black men. The
day of the minstrel show is over.79
The day of the minstrel show is, indeed, over.
Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 940 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Wyzanski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
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